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The First World War in German East Africa was significantly different than the 
war in Europe. More so than just the geographical difference and that Europe still 
stands at the forefront of popular memory, the environment of equatorial Africa played 
an equally significant role as an enemy to the British Army as did the German Army. 
Rather than just a collection of assorted stories, it is the aim of this article to examine 
the interaction between the British Army and the environment of German East Africa 
from 1914-1918 and demonstrate that three environmental factors – climate, disease, 
and terrain – significantly affected the war and the soldiers that fought in it in a variety 
of ways, both in terms of military operations and on the human level.
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Introduction
Innumerable monographs, articles, encyclopaedias, tomes and lexicons have been 
dedicated to the First World War in Europe, but few have been written on the war 
in the colonies. Indeed, Professor Sir Hew Strachan notes, regarding the overseas 
colonial enterprise in the years before and during the war, “the colonial was the least 
significant, and it roused little tension”.1 As the war raged on, Europe stood front and 
centre while the war in the colonies remained on the periphery of public consciousness. 
“Despite its cost in men and money the campaign in [the colonies] was, and is, often 
referred to as a mere sideshow.”2 In reality, however, a substantial portion of the war 
took place on the periphery, and a new wave of scholarly endeavours has recently 
been dedicated to European empires in wartime and the soldiers and fighting that took 
place outside of Europe. Burgeoning from these new studies and most significant to 
this article is the scholarly effort on the First World War in Africa.3 
The nomenclature of the First World War is significant. Colonial soldiers from 
India, the West Indies, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, South Africa, Egypt and 
many more fought in Western Europe. Indeed, between one and two million African 
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soldiers fought for the Allies in some capacity in the First World War.4 A few decades 
ago, study of the western front, and to a lesser extent the eastern front, was the standard 
approach to the historiography of the war.5 Furthermore, the first large-scale use of 
chemical warfare, one of the defining features of modern warfare around this time, 
occurred in 1911 and 1912 when the Italian army launched a chemical attack against 
the African Berber population in Tripolitania.6 Similarly, the first use of aircraft in 
warfare occurred in 1911 when Italian planes bombed a Libyan camp during the Italo–
Turkish War.7
To truly make the war a ‘world war’ beyond the diverse combatants in the fields 
of Europe, fighting had to take place all over the world – and it did: from the fields 
of France to the coast of Chile, to the occupation of German Samoa, to the battle of 
Pita Baka in New Guinea, and to the diverse terrain in Africa. Indeed, “this was a war 
between empires” in every sense.8 Jan Smuts, South African defence minister at the 
time and later becoming a British Field General who led campaigns in German South-
West Africa and German East Africa said he led 
[An] army [that] was an amazingly polyglot one. There 
were men from the United Kingdom, from South Africa, 
Cape Corps, Gold Coast, Nigeria and the West Indies; from 
Kashmir, Jhind, Bhurtpur and Kaparthalu; Boer Settlers from 
East Africa; Rhodesians, King’s African Rifles native troops 
[recruited from across boundaries in East Africa], Uganda 
contingents, Arabs, as well as Belgian and Portuguese troops.9 
Yet, few know this. Many modern students can name the major battles in Europe 
(the Somme, Verdun), but how recognisable is the Lake Tanganyika campaign or the 
battle of Kilimanjaro or the battle of Tanga to a non-specialist? This is particularly 
noteworthy for the war in German East Africa. Historian Ross Anderson notes: 
It was never of first importance, yet it ranged from the 
modern states of Kenya and Uganda … through the Congo, 
Ruanda, Burundi, and Tanzania … to Zambia, Malawi and 
Mozambique … Few inhabitants… escaped its effects or 
ravages … If it was insignificant in global terms, the war there 
was of overwhelming local consequence.”10 
Jan Smuts’ son theorised in a biography of his father, ‘the East Africa campaign …
while apparently a minor side-show in this great world-war, may yet have important 
bearings on the future history of the world’.11
The scope of the war clearly proclaimed, “Africa mattered to the European 
powers” and served a key, if peripheral, role throughout the war.12 Several reasons 
denote the importance of the war on the periphery – millions of Africans contributed to 
the war effort, countless resources from Europe (especially Britain) flowed into Africa 
including: soldiers, food, weapons and money. The British metropole in London sent 
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around £2.8 billion pounds (adjusted for inflation) to Africa.13 Indeed, “the financial 
cost to the Allies of the Great War in sub-Saharan Africa was immense.”14 Many 
British generals made famous by their exploits in the fields of France and Belgium 
cut their teeth in Africa – Kitchener, Haig, and French to name a few.15  The first 
shots fired by Britain in the First World War were not fired on the fields of France or 
Belgium, but “by a regimental sergeant-major of the West African Frontier Force in 
(German) Togoland”.16
As Ross Anderson notes in the title of his book, the war in Africa was The 
forgotten front.17 But, “the development of the [modern British] army was profoundly 
shaped by imperial warfare… and these tactical lessons were of considerable value 
in 1914.”18 Despite the great strides made in academic works recently,19 one key 
piece of study still lacks depth – the impact of the environment. Several overviews 
of environmental history in Africa have been written during the last few decades, but 
few studies focused on the relationship between war and the environment.20 The role 
of the environment in the First World War (and war in general) is an understudied 
but significant area of scholarship. Nations and empires have ascended and collapsed 
under the weight of the environment.21 
The significance of this study lies in connecting these themes – environmental 
history and the First World War in German East Africa. In the works that address the 
colonial aspect of the First World War in Africa, there is a lack of in-depth analysis of 
the role of the environment. In the works that address environmental history during 
wartime, none has researched the First World War in Africa.22 Some military historians 
have demonstrated the importance of the environment in passing or have focused 
on the terrain of specific campaigns, but did not make the environment the driving 
agent of the argument. For example, Ross Anderson notes, “the extremes of climate 
and terrain found in East Africa meant that campaign conditions were usually very 
difficult” compared to the conditions found in Europe during the war.23 He continues, 
“another dominating factor was the prevalence of disease.”24 Few works, however, 
have directly examined the intersections between environmental and military history 
and offered a succinct study by giving agency to the environment.25 Indeed 
[R]arely … have we studied nature as a soldier. And rarely 
have we explicitly considered the ecological consequences 
of warfare as a central, distinctive element of humans’ 
historically evolving relation to the natural world.26 
Nevertheless, the environment consistently played a key role throughout history. 
Indeed, the natural environment is front and centre in many primary accounts of 
war, but the secondary literature often overlooks this information in favour of social 
aspects—nature is merely a backdrop of the physical and psychological attrition.27 
But as Richard P. Tucker notes, “nature’s faces are legion”.28
Therefore, this research project examined the environmental history of German 
East Africa during the First World War, specifically concerning soldiers from the 
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British Empire.29 The unique conditions in German East Africa during the war years 
presented a variety of environmental problems for an army conducting war. The size 
of the territory as well as environmental factors such as the tropical climate created 
enormous problems of supplying soldiers over so large a landscape. Additionally, 
the tropical climate also presented the perfect conditions for diseases and insects to 
wreak havoc. Finally, the natural features, such as what contemporaries referred to as 
‘the dense bush,’ of German East Africa must be mentioned because it played such 
a significant role in the business of war and the lives of the soldiers. These three 
environmental factors – climate, disease and terrain – significantly affected the war 
and the soldiers who fought in it in a variety of ways. 
In order to demonstrate these factors, much of this research focuses on the 
development of several key questions: 
•	  Were the successes and failures of the British Army attributable to leadership, 
or did the environment – through disease, terrain or climate – significantly 
shape the outcome of the battles in German East Africa in 1914–1918? 
•	 How did the environment shape British military decisions? 
•	 How did the environment affect the soldiers? 
•	  In which ways did these individuals deal with difficulties imposed by 
environmental conditions? 
The answer to these questions will enhance our understanding of the environmental 
dimension in terms of the discussion of the First World War on the periphery.30 The 
present study engaged these questions in order to add to this discourse.
To address these questions, I draw primarily upon a limited number of diaries, 
memoirs, letters, and writings of a few English-speaking officers who lived through 
this period. Perhaps most significant are those of General Jan Smuts (South African 
statesman and later a British army general, commander of the British Army in German 
South-West Africa [1914–1916] and German East Africa [1916–1918]).31 Smuts was 
a competent guerrilla fighter, equal to Lettow-Vorbeck (commander of the German 
forces in East Africa), having commanded successful campaigns as a Boer general in 
the Second Boer War (1899–1902) as well as German South West Africa (1914–1916). 
Secretary of State for War Lord Kitchener, with the unanimous approval of the British 
War Committee, appointed Smuts to take command of British forces in German 
East Africa in February 1916 in response to Lettow’s success.32 Smuts’ writings are 
extensive as he was a public figure for much of his life, and my selection is certainly 
not exhaustive – the Smuts Collection at the South African National Archives holds 
much, much more. I have carefully selected a few edited volumes of his letters and 
memoirs as well as a biography written by his son here, which directly speaks to 
how the environment shaped the British army in German East Africa. Additionally, I 
examined the writings of one of Smuts’ adjutant generals (General JHV Crowe), as 
well as the writings of several British army officers and doctors.33 
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The intrinsic bias in such an approach must be addressed head-on. These were 
mostly upper-class, senior officers who most likely represented the ‘white-man’s 
burden’ mentality reminiscent of the famous ‘Rhodes Colossus’ political cartoon. 
Some quotes in the subsequent pages might reflect this same idea. Historians have 
long since moved passed the white-washing of European empires in Africa and I must 
reiterate why it is important now to emphasise that the writings of these British officers 
are in no way comprehensive. This article should therefore not be mistaken as the final 
word on the British experience in German East Africa during the First World War. The 
sources here are noticeably skewed to British soldiers of rank, arguably further away 
from the environment than the average enlisted man. Many average soldiers wrote 
about their experiences during the war. For example, CW Shackleton, a South African 
infantryman wrote a wonderfully illustrated account called East African Experiences.34 
However, I have deliberately chosen just a few rank-heavy examples in order to form a 
baseline for further research into this field and to demonstrate broadly the relationship 
between the environment and British imperial efforts during the First World War. 
The environment in German East Africa
Jan Smuts describing his time in German East Africa to his son, 1950, said:
It is impossible for those unacquainted with German East 
Africa to realize the physical, transport, and supply difficulties 
of the advance over this magnificent country of unrivalled 
scenery and fertility, consisting of great mountain systems 
alternating with huge plains; with a great rainfall and 
wide, unbridged rivers in the regions of the mountains, and 
insufficient surface water on the plains for the needs of an 
army; with magnificent bush and primeval forest everywhere, 
pathless, trackless, except for the spoor of the elephant or the 
narrow footpaths of the natives.35
As war has changed over the centuries, so has the effect of warring empires on 
the environment. One constant has remained: the significant interplay between the 
environment and war. The environment in warfare can be viewed as two sides of the 
same coin–the impact of war on the environment and the impact of the environment on 
war. In the aftermath of a battle, the landscape exhibits the most obvious consequences 
of war, other than the loss of life. This was no different on battlefields during the First 
World War. Nearly every battle left some grim visage of nature in its wake–zigzagging 
trenches dug into the earth in Belgium and France or blown out of mountains in 
Italy and Austria, artillery craters pockmarked along hundreds of miles of no man’s 
land, displaced or decimated populations of regional fauna, the complete absence 
of vegetation that could no longer grow in the mud that replaced crop fields and 
woodlands, and “ghost forest[s] of trees stripped of branches and leaves”.36 
Perhaps the most famous image of this landscape came from the Battle of 
Passchendaele in 1917 (see Figure 1). Australian war photographer Frank Hurley 
captured an image of soldiers walking across duckboards surrounded by mud and earth. 
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Every tree for miles was stripped of all foliage. Splinters of wood were haphazardly 
scattered everywhere from explosions and machine gun fire. Artillery craters were 
filled with muddy water. The entire backdrop was bleak and miserable. General Jan 
Smuts once told his son that the war depicted in images like this was nothing more 
than “a muddy world of trenches and barbed wire”.37
Fig. 1: James Francis Hurley, Australians crossing chateau wood via duckboard, 
October 29, 1917, by permission of the Australian War Memorial, ID E01220. 
Artillery soldiers of the 4th Australian Division near Hooge cross a makeshift, 
duckboard bridge during the final days of the Third Battle of Ypres.
The impact of battles on the landscape was deliberate at times, such as scorched 
earth policies, and accidental at other times. A soldier could duck into his foxhole to 
avoid a bullet or an artillery shell, but a tree, a field of crops, or animals could not 
escape this industrialised war. War rarely has a positive effect on the environment and 
its repercussions continue to be felt long after the fighting ceases. When the soldiers 
leave, they do not take their natural weapons with them. After the soldiers had fired 
their last shots, the affected civilians must suffer for years (sometimes decades) the 
consequences of a war in which they did not participate. Smuts’ son later noted of his 
father’s time in Africa, “the Germans had exhibited their characteristic thoroughness 
in their retreat by poisoning and polluting all water supplies”, which is an effective 
military tactic against a pursuing enemy army, but devastating to the population that 
relies on those same supplies for drinking water.38 The British soldiers, mostly cut off 
from consistent supply lines, lived off the land as best they could. This age-old strategy 
devastated local vegetation and cultivated land. When the soldiers left and their guns 
fell silent, the impact they left on the environment resulted in a “long-lasting famine 
and pandemic that affected southeastern Africa long after the war’s end”.39
Also noteworthy is the effect of fighting in a particular environment for so long. 
As Jan Smuts described to his son, “the campaign … assumed more and more the 
character of a campaign against nature, in which climate, geography, and disease 
fought more effectively against us than the well-trained forces of the enemy”.40 
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Christopher Thornhill, a British intelligence officer, wrote “[the] campaign [in German 
East Africa] was unique of its kind: the first tropical warfare waged under modern 
conditions of transport and armament”.41 Similarly, General JHV Crowe reported that 
the country was composed entirely of “natural obstacles and climatic difficulties of the 
most formidable character”.42
Climate
Everyday climatic occurrences, such as rain, had an enormous influence on 
soldiers. This would seem obvious, but deserves explanation. Rain frequently falls 
all over the world. During war, however, rain has a much more nuanced effect on 
people than during times of peace. In peacetime, one can take shelter and move about 
freely in an effort to avoid the rain. The same cannot happen if that person knows 
enemy soldiers are around any corner or hiding, waiting for a mistake. During the 
First World War, this situation created such a demoralising effect that it affected the 
outcome of battles.43 “From a military point of view the climate is an all-important 
factor,” General JHV Crowe wrote.44
Furthermore, rain can completely demoralise or exhaust an army without an 
enemy in sight. One night in particular, Smuts experienced “the worst thunder storm 
within my experience accompanied by torrents of rain [which] … kept the commando 
awake the whole night in a soaking wet condition”.45 By the next day, his soldiers 
were too exhausted to engage their enemy decisively.46 The following month, in the 
same conflict, Smuts abandoned an engagement “because it was beginning to rain” 
and he feared the rain would have a disastrous effect on his soldiers.47 Indeed, rain 
often has a similar effect on all soldiers. 
Rain is a common occurrence with or without war in all parts of the world. 
However, the rain in equatorial Africa deserves special attention. That is not to say 
rain did not affect the morale of soldiers everywhere. Notably across the equator in 
Europe, one soldier made simple the power of rain on morale, “the mood among the 
soldiers brightened considerably, as the rain gave way and the starry-night cleared 
with the promise of a dry morning”.48 However, there was significant difference 
between the rain in Europe and Africa. The ‘rainy seasons’ in equatorial Africa were 
incomparable to the atmospheric conditions experienced by soldiers in Europe. 
One officer begrudgingly hypothesised, “it came on to rain in a manner that is only 
possible in the tropics–a deluge that is unknown in more temperate climates”.49 This 
constant ‘torrent’ of rain made soldiers miserable.50 In April 1916, Jan Smuts recorded 
the small town called Moshi (located in modern Tanzania) had accumulated over 
twenty inches of rain.51 In only a few weeks’ time, another British Officer noted, “as 
much as ten inches [of rain] had fallen on certain sections of the road”.52 During these 
rainy periods, it would rain for months without end creating an even more unbearable 
experience for the soldiers. 
Early during the First World War, Smuts realised the effect of rain. He once 
commented to his son how his “troops [were] generally… shaken in morale” following 
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a disastrous defeat at the Battle of Salatia Hill in February 1916 – Smuts attributed this 
to almost completely restricted visibility from a combination of the dense bush and 
the rainy conditions.53 Throughout letter after letter to his wife and colleagues Smuts 
complained about the rainy season and its effect on himself and his soldiers.54 Indeed – 
[T]he rainy season which set in with extreme violence forced 
us to consider how the climate and seasons were going to 
affect our campaign … in the rainy seasons which occupy 
about half the year much of the country becomes a swamp 
and military movements become impracticable.55 
Another British officer, Captain Downes who led a Brigade of Nigerian colonial 
soldiers, echoed Smuts’ detestation of the rain, “it is perhaps hard to realize the 
difficulties which the rainy season in East Africa entailed for a force acting from such 
widely separated bases”.56 He later continued about the effect on the morale of his 
soldiers:
[W]hen it was left to a man, soon after eighteen months’ 
campaign, to choose between wife, children, good food and 
a comfortable home, and shortage of food, rain, marching, 
fatigue, and hard work in a foreign country, it was hardly to 
be expected that many would choose the latter in preference 
of the former.57
Along with the misery for the soldiers, the already poor infrastructure was 
worsened by climatic conditions. Rain frequently washed away bridges, traversable 
roads, and mountain passes that existed and detrimentally affected the army’s ability to 
carry on with the war effectively.58 “You cannot imagine how dangerous the rains are 
in this country,” Smuts once wrote to his wife.59 On arriving in German East Africa, 
another British officer noted, “the first march out was about twelve miles, but owing 
to the heavy rains the condition of the road from the very first was terrible”.60 Another 
added, “movement during the rainy season is practically impossible”.61 Reliable 
communication and ability to supply are essential for any effective military, but in this 
country communication and consistent supply lines were luxuries not always afforded 
because of the “great rains”.62 
The supply troubles caused by the rainy season were devastating. Supply lines 
were broken; therefore, soldiers could not be resupplied. Soldiers who were not 
resupplied with steady provisions could not engage the enemy and be expected to be 
victorious. One of Smuts’ adjutant generals noted:
[A]ll seemed to be going well when … heavy rain began to 
fall, ushering in the wettest season known in East Africa for 
many years … lines of communication … were interrupted 
by the washing away of bridges and the flooding of roads: 
and operations in all areas were hence-forward seriously 
hampered by the untimely rain.63 
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There was always a dire and concerted effort to accomplish as much as possible 
before the rainy season arrived.64 Indeed, “the transport question was the great 
problem throughout the campaign,” another senior officer wrote: 
[O]nce the rains commenced, there would no longer be any 
possibility of using motor transport … we knew that the 
roads, or tracks, became absolute quagmires, not inches, but 
feet deep in mud as the result of heavy rain.65
It is significant to note the effect the constant deluge had on soldiers. This should 
be seen as more than just a collection of random stories in which the soldiers were 
unhappy because of the rain, which occurred in every theatre of the war. The rainy 
seasons in equatorial Africa exponentially compounded the misery the soldiers felt. 
The African rain had a significant depressive effect as demonstrated by many letters 
and memoirs from the soldiers who lived through it. They wrote about it a lot, but not 
always just from a strategic stand point – much of the writing was simply to complain 
about it because for much of the year the rain did not stop. “Owing to the heavy rains 
the condition on the road … was terrible,” Captain Downes wrote in his diary.66 He 
later added, “rain promised… a poisonous night”.67 When “the rain began to fall … it 
poured incessantly from that time onwards”, which always made progress “slow and 
difficult”.68 The East African rain directly hindered and halted military operations at 
regular intervals as well as devastating the soldiers.69 
Dark, ominous clouds as far as the eye could see enveloped the sky and shut out 
the sun. There was no hope-inspiring scenic view of the tropics like one would usually 
see on a tropical postcard; instead there was a dark, grey overcast, which created a 
natural depressant. The thunder was almost indistinguishable from a cannon.70 The 
deluge of water pouring against the canopy of the jungle was deafening. Puddles 
converted the dry African dust into thick mud that was nearly impossible to move 
through.71 “The rivers were in flood, the dongas were rivers, the black cotton and red 
clay soil had all become swamp”.72 Soldiers were constantly drenched and without 
regular supply shipments they were forced to wear their soaked clothing for weeks at 
a time with no respite, which lead to countless cases of trench foot.73 One might be 
able to escape into the dense bush to hide from the enemy, but there was nowhere to 
hide from the endless torrent of rain.
The monsoon-like rain washed away supplies of food in addition to the makeshift 
infrastructure required in war. Part of the supply troubles included necessities for the 
soldiers. An already awful experience of war was made worse by supply troubles. 
“The summer rains had arrived and … we had no tents” or provisions of any kind, 
one officer bemoaned; therefore, “we had some uncomfortable wet nights sleeping 
on the ground” in the rainy season.74 Another officer echoed this sentiment, “every 
afternoon for the past week it had rained extremely hard,” he wrote, “the 3rd Nigeria 
Regiment and guns had a most unpleasant march… as it had rained incessantly during 
their journey”.75 Another all too important supply that should not be overlooked was 
medicine, especially quinine (discussed further in the next section). 
37
Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of Military Studies, Vol 46, Nr 2, 2018. doi: 10.5787/46-2-1203
Even after the rainy season, the climate fared little better for the army. The once 
wet areas became arid, inhospitable deserts. As Napoleon attested, an army marches 
on its stomach. However, a slight adjustment is necessary for soldiering in Africa. 
Even more essential than Napoleon’s insistence on food was the necessity of water for 
soldiers, especially in Africa.76 Water scarcity was an imposing danger for soldiers.77 
The hot, waterless deserts became even more unbearable, if possible, with the 
absence of water for the soldiers on long, grueling marches. Soaking wet conditions 
or waterless lakes were the only options depending upon the season. “It is a case of 
nothing or too much,” Smuts once lamented.78
Disease
Accompanying this problem of too much or too little water was one of the most 
notorious sources of casualties in war: disease. The rainy seasons in equatorial Africa 
lead to perfect breeding conditions for mosquitos. As we saw in Figure 1, there were 
undoubtedly breeding grounds for mosquitos in Europe, but the difference is that 
in German East Africa, puddles of similar sizes to those in the fields of Ypres were 
far more likely to contain malaria mosquitos. For the first time in history, battlefield 
wounds, not disease, was the main cause of death in Europe – the same was not 
true in equatorial Africa.79 Diseases (a high percentage being malaria cases) “killed 
hundreds of thousands of people”.80 Indeed, “the coastal belt and the valleys … even 
in dry weather are unhealthy for all… and during the rains there is a great increase 
in malaria, while dysentery and pneumonia strike down even the Africa native”.81 A 
British doctor wrote, “I knew that this [East African] rain must mean a new outbreak 
of fever for many of us”.82 A scarcity of water lead to poor health for the soldiers 
through dehydration, heat stroke, and weakened immune systems. The “vast waterless 
areas were another serious difficulty which hampered operations. In East Africa the 
water question [must be] the first consideration”.83 The word ‘disease’ is a blanket 
term to refer to an entire host of complications during the First World War; however, 
often the disease in question was malaria caused by mosquito bites. 
Equatorial Africa notoriously houses deadly diseases, for instance malaria, 
cause by disease-carrying insects, such as mosquitos. “Everywhere the fierce heat of 
equatorial Africa, accompanied by a wild luxuriance of parasitic life, breeding tropical 
diseases in the unacclimatised whites … these conditions make life… in that country 
far from a pleasure trip,” Smuts later noted sarcastically.84 Given the enormous tract 
of land comprising German East Africa, it is unsurprising that disease played such 
a regular role in the lives of soldiers. Indeed, “it was a land of … mosquito, jigger 
flea and horse-sickness fly” and “the malaria mosquito [was] everywhere, except on 
the highest plateaux … everywhere belts [were] infested with the deadly tsetse fly,” 
which took an enormous toll on Smuts’ army both psychologically and physically, not 
to mention the British army’s limited supply of livestock and beasts of burden.85 A 
doctor who accompanied the British Army wrote in his diary: 
So great was the number of new cases [of malaria each day] 
… that I took special stock of our quinine, to see if I could 
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deal with the regiment in what I took to be the proper way, 
giving every man in it a regular prophylactic dose. I found that 
if this were done I should soon be tapping my reserves. The 
risk of being stranded without any was too grave to be taken.86 
He therefore had to assess carefully which cases he could treat and which ones 
he could not. One soldier put it as mildly as possible after a 29-kilometer march, 
commenting that the “mosquitos [were] rather a nuisance”.87 Indeed, according to 
Captain Downes, “malaria was at all times the chief enemy”.88
Disease debilitated nearly every soldier from the lowest private to the most 
powerful general. No one was immune. In 1916, Smuts was bitten by an infected 
anopheles’ mosquito and spent his whole life recovering from his bout of malaria.89 
Smuts, as well as most infected soldiers, had a body temperature of 104 °F (40 °C) and 
a constant aching pain.90 Of the roughly 58000 British soldiers deployed in German 
East Africa in 1916, around 50000 were infected with malaria (or some similar tropical 
disease).91 Smuts estimated that “between October and December [1916] we evacuated 
between 12,000 and 15,000 patients, mostly malaria cases”.92 The following year, 
1917, saw a 20 percent increase of soldiers and subsequent infection rates.93 Smuts 
estimated, “the incidence of disease casualties to battle casualties [from 1916–1918] 
was in the ratio of 31 to 1”.94 “Large numbers” of soldiers and civilians frequently 
“went down with malaria in the pestilential” country.95 The prevalence of disease and 
the extreme weather conditions in equatorial Africa provided a natural Fabian strategy 
for both sides to employ as an effective fighting tactic. Indeed, “in no other campaign 
could sickness have played so important a part”.96 One British captain noted that over 
a twelve-month period from 1916–1917, only six soldiers of the original 42 in one 
of his battalions remained fighting-fit.97 The attrition rate of soldiers was shocking, 
“about 80 percent of the regiments was, after [the first] few months, no longer fit for 
active service” because of the conditions in German East Africa.98 
The conditions that armies and the indigenous population endured during the 
war made them exceptionally susceptible to disease. Soldiers frequently fell victim 
to sickness “largely owing to the privations they had undergone.”99 Rapid and 
grueling marches across countless miles over such short periods led to malnutrition 
and weakened immune systems.100 Sometimes they marched more than 180km in a 
week and more than 100km in three days!101 Regular shortages of food were common 
among the columns of soldiers and porters employed by the army. One British Army 
Doctor noted, “we, like the beasts, were faint with hunger and heat” and were often 
“too tired to sleep”.102 Indeed, “men nearly went to sleep whilst marching, and would 
wake up with a start as they stumbled on the track”.103
An army may march on its stomach, but the soldiers in German East Africa “had 
been making forced marches and fighting on half rations or less” for a significant 
portion of the campaign.104 The combination of exhaustion and malnutrition provided 
the perfect breeding ground for disease in their weakened states.105 One British 
contemporary wrote in his journal:
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[I]n all this campaign our most deadly enemy was not the 
human foe who stubbornly retreated before us, but this … 
devil of fever who had laid waste that miserable village 
community in the Lumi swamp … how terrible was the power 
[this jungle fever] wielded.106
The threat of death from the enemy or disease-carrying insects was ever- present 
and of absolute concern; an underrated problem accompanying insects was the trouble 
and annoyance noted in several diary entries. At first glance, this issue may seem trivial, 
but soldiers are human beings subject to the same irritations as everyone. Far from the 
comforts of his home and family, one soldier noted the ever-present annoyance of bugs 
and being consistently “troubled with ants.”107 Mosquitos, ants, and jigger fleas harassed 
the soldiers all months of the year.108 By late 1916, some soldiers were simply “fed up 
with this campaign” because of the awful conditions.109 One British officer questioned, 
“I wonder if my reader has ever encountered [African] driver ants?” He continued, 
[T]hey are more terrible than any German; they can make a 
reasonable being do the Marathon in record time; they will 
make a sane man jump into a stream or fling off his clothes 
and roll in the grass … they will take up residence in a house 
and no one will enter … Saintly men will rage like fiends 
when by chance… these “drivers” have the whim to wander 
up his trousers … their power to disturb is immense. They are 
invincible.110
Smuts once noted that “animals died by the thousand[s] after passing through a… 
fly belt” of disease in Africa.111 Similarly, Captain WD Downes saw beasts of burden 
dying “at the rate of about a hundred a week … Pack animals died after a single journey, 
if not before”.112 One British army doctor who served in German East Africa, Francis 
Brett Young, was astonished by the impact on wildlife in the aftermath of a battle. He 
wrote:
Out in the swamp, even without knowing it, one’s ears had 
been accustomed to the innumerable murmurs of winged life. 
Here the silence was as profound as that which slumbers at the 
bottom of the sea, in great depths where there is no life at all. 
The trunks of the trees stood as motionless as though they had 
been carved out of coral, and the lianas with which they were 
hung seemed as little alive as the painted foliage of a theatre: 
for in these lower levels of the forest no breath of air stirred.113
The casualty rate among animals was always “naturally very heavy” wherever the 
armies went, and they were consistently “dying by the hundreds”.114 
Much like the rain, there were exponentially more insects in equatorial Africa than in 
South Africa or Europe, from where the soldiers generally came. These men often came 
from mild climates and were thrust into a tropical atmosphere.115 They were often tired, 
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hot, and irritable. A good night’s sleep was the exception not the norm – indeed, these 
were some of the worst nights the soldiers had ever encountered in their lives.116 Lack 
of sleep, irritability, and disease destroyed the soldiers’ will to fight.  In peace, one can 
brush off an ant from a sleeve; one can go to the hospital to receive medical treatment for 
a case of malaria or dysentery. But during war, one cannot enjoy the luxuries of civilian 
life. The diseases and the insects carrying them were a constant threat to the army. If 
more than half of a fighting force was indisposed due to diseases and insects, it could 
not fight effectively or win a battle. 
Terrain
The impact the environment had on the war was not limited to frequently 
changing weather or the patterns of disease. The sometimes-static landscape also 
played a decisive role in the war in German East Africa. Hindsight offers an easy 
window into the aftermath of a battle. One need only look at the field on which it was 
fought. Commanders looked for the high ground or the dense bush for cover to gain 
an advantage over the enemy. Indeed, the landscape chooses the battlefield as often as 
the general does. Leaders often deduced the advantages of occupying the high points 
surrounded by “bush-covered terrain”, which usually presented a decided advantage 
to the army that encountered it first.117 As Smuts explained to his son, “As powerful as 
[any] enemy’s military force, the physical and climatic difficulties of the country [add] 
vastly to his power of defence”.118 The general that fought on his terms and chose his 
landscape owned the pivotal advantage. After occupying a particularly critical stretch 
of land known as the Salaita Hill in late 1916, Smuts marvelled at its influence act on 
his soldiers’ confidence: 
[N]ever before had I seen so sudden and complete a 
transformation in the spirits of opposing forces; our men, who 
had retreated before the enemy in the confusion now advanced 
with dauntless élan against the hidden foe in the dense bush of 
the mountain slopes or the Ruwu swamps.119 
Hills covered with bush and trees offered excellent advantages for defending 
forces.120 While German East Africa contained a plethora of these advantageous 
positions, the terrain usually did not offer an advantage.
Equally as common to choosing the land a general wanted to avoid a stretch 
of land that made military operations difficult, or even impossible. Soldiers did not 
always have to contend with just the dense bush. Throughout German East Africa 
“the ground almost everywhere [was composed of] a rich black or red cotton soil, 
which any transport converts into mud in the rain or dust in the drought”.121 This made 
transportation in cars or trucks equally as difficult as transportation through the thick 
vegetation of the dense bush. It also made marching difficult, if not impossible, for 
the soldiers because the “road[s were] extremely dusty and [covered with] dense bush 
as usual”.122 Additionally, the terrain allowed opposing soldiers to escape decisive 
battles repeatedly.123 “The African bush, with its limited visibility [made it] practically 
impossible to enclose an enemy”.124 
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Fighting in German East Africa was a vastly different experience from the open 
fields and clearly defined trench lines in France and Belgium. Soldiers of European 
empires were hastily trained to fight with Napoleonic tactics – two armies met on 
opposing sides of a field and fought in this conventional manner. Even the static 
nature of war in Western Europe clearly defined two opposing forces. Some senior 
officers, such as Smuts and Crowe fought in colonial wars and rebellions, but many of 
the soldiers who fought in German East Africa during the First World War were raw 
recruits who had never experienced a battle.125 They were trained to meet the enemy 
in a field and engage in battle. They were never fully prepared to fight a guerrilla war 
in the dense bush. In German East Africa enemy positions, occupied territory, and 
movement were in a constant state of fluidity.
Many places in an enormous territory such as German East Africa were 
uncultivated, untouched, and lacked any sort of infrastructure familiar to soldiers 
who were used to the European-style roads, bridges, buildings, and power supplies in 
places such as France, Britain, Germany, and South Africa (see Figure 2).126 The scale 
of the country was of particular note as well. 
It is difficult to realize the [true size of the] area represented 
by a map. The extent of the country is actually about twice 
that of the German Empire in Europe, or as extensive as 
Germany, Italy, Switzerland, the Netherlands, and Denmark 
taken together.127 
As noted, these areas were largely untouched by humanity. “Here and there is a 
clearing where one finds a native village, which consists of a … few acres of in the 
vicinity [which] are cultivated, but the country generally is bush or jungle”.128 
Figure 2: Bridge construction over the Mgeta River in German East Africa, 27 
August, 1916, by permission of the Centenary of World War I in Orange, Orange City 
Council. A rudimentary bridge under construction.
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In German East Africa, there were few roads, bridges or lines of communication 
and the roads that existed were often “impassable for … transport” (see Figure 2).129 
The existing maps at the time were often unreliable. “On the maps which have 
been published… roads are shown running in all directions”, however, “these are 
imaginary. There were no roads … Roads had to be cut and made step by step as the 
columns [of soldiers] advanced”.130 The imaginary roads led to difficulties for any 
army trying to effectively operate in the theatre. “The supply and transport situation 
was bad,” another contemporary noted matter-of-factly, and at times, “mechanical 
transport … became impossible”.131 In the early years of the war the only two railway 
lines throughout the entire territory were easy prey for sabotage and were effectively 
destroyed, which ruined any chance of functioning lines of communication or supply 
chains over railways.132 
Nearly all the soldiers who wrote about their time in German East Africa noted 
the ‘bush-covered terrain’ and the ‘dense bush’ and the impenetrable greenery in 
many parts of the country. The undergrowth in many of these areas was substantial 
and unchecked by humans. Indigenous trees, vines, grasses, and shrubs of countless 
colours, shapes, sizes, and varieties dominated the land more than any army ever could 
(see Figure 3).133 Inside the forests, the canopy completely blocked out any sunlight 
– one British officer called it a “primeval forest under a tropical sun”.134 Vines were 
so long and erratic that soldiers would become wrapped and tangled in them. It was 
“a close tangle of trees with thick undergrowth, which is practically impenetrable”.135 
Grasses were so thick that one could hardly step through them. Shrubbery and bushes 
were nearly impenetrable because no one knew what they would find inside. 
Figure 3: Aerial view of the Rufiji River, c.1915, by permission by the Australian 
War Memorial, ID A02660. Roughly 180 kilometres southwest of Dar es Salaam, the 
Rufiji River is flanked by ‘dense bush’ on all sides.
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The dense bush offered protection and danger alike. It provided the perfect cover 
for a retreating army or soldiers who wanted to go undetected. But it also provided 
numerous hazards and problems. The complications of the dense bush did not stop at 
inhibiting supplies and marches. One could find anything from poisonous plants to 
dangerous animals. “The lion and the rhinoceros were the worst enemies,” one officer 
claimed.136 Another stressed that concealed inside were all manner of poisonous 
plants. For example, another officer described the poisonous effects of the “buffalo 
bean” plant:
It grows on a low shrub, and as one walks through the bush one 
brushed off the short    hairs which cover it with a velvet-Uke 
down. At first the presence of the bean is not even noticed; 
then slight irritation is felt round the bare knees and naked 
arms while the hairs of the bean work their way into the skin. 
The irritation gets rapidly worse as the hairs are blown by the 
breeze up the legs and all over the body, till the whole body is 
smothered in the dreadful thing. The more one scratches the 
worse the irritation becomes, and the more quickly it seems 
to spread. The only cure known by myself is to rub dry earth 
into the skin, but this, on a wet night, is impossible. The wet 
makes this dreadful complaint a hundred per cent worse, till 
maddened with irritation, one rolls on the ground and curses 
the bean, the bush on which it grows, and the country that has 
the audacity to produce such a bush.137
As noted, the dense bush made transportation (especially of large numbers of 
soldiers and porters) impractical at best and literally impossible at worst. In some 
instances, the only way to get to their destination was for an army to march all the way 
around the dense bush for hundreds of kilometers. Tanks to break through thick areas 
were not an option in the African theatre. The trucks and vehicles available were ill-
designed for the tropical obstacles they faced. Trucks would become tangled in grass 
or vines, stuck, and had to be abandoned. Walking through the thicket was equally 
difficult. One contemporary noted the extreme “difficulty of advancing in line through 
the dense bush”.138 Marching came to a snail’s pace because the soldiers had to wade 
through the overabundance of flora coupled with the tropical fauna they encountered. 
The terrain of German East Africa made the war exponentially more difficult than 
it would have been for soldiers without the added challenge of nature. For the great 
advantage the high ground could offer, everything else about the terrain presented 
immense complications. These problems directly shaped the ability of the army to 
carry out the war effectively. Repeatedly, the dense bush or the thick mud halted 
soldiers in their tracks or allowed an enemy to hide completely undetected. Few 
decisive engagements ever occurred because of the terrain in German East Africa.139 
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Conclusion
The sheer size of the territory and the stifling climate fashioned massive supply 
problems over so large a landscape. The tropical climate presented two equally 
damaging complications: too much water or too little water. The rainy seasons 
would inundate the country with so much water that it created a variety of conditions 
hazardous enough during peacetime, but exponentially worse during war. The 
other half of the year proved equally detrimental as a scarcity of water created life-
threatening conditions. The dense bush of the country constituted another equally 
imposing enemy. The climate and geography also created the necessary conditions for 
debilitating diseases such as malaria and its insect carrier, the mosquito, to proliferate 
and adversely affect an enormous percentage of officers and soldiers. These three 
environmental factors, climate, disease, and terrain, significantly influenced the war 
and the soldiers who fought in it in a variety of ways – both in terms of military 
operations and on the human level. Although we have only looked at a handful of 
officers here, who undoubtedly had an easier time under such conditions because of 
the privileges of rank, it would be right to assume that many of the soldiers who 
served in German East Africa were young and homesick. They lamented the tropical 
deluges they endured for months on end, the grave sicknesses they endured, and the 
impenetrable greenery they encountered every day. Indeed, “in German East Africa 
everything possible that a man could be up against, except cold, existed: Germans, 
wild beasts, sickness, heat, hunger, flood,” wrote one British officer.140 
Viewing the First World War in Africa through the lens of environmental history 
demands a re-examination of what we think we know about this subject. The popular 
version of the war is rife with stories about Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck, the ‘Lion of 
Africa’ and such heroic, mythical conclusions that even though Germany lost the war, 
Lettow was never defeated.141 The recent wave of scholarship dedicated to the war 
in German East Africa from academic historians such as Ross Anderson, Jonathan 
Krause, Edward Paice, Hew Strachan and Anne Samson has been long overdue and 
is certainly welcome additions to the historiography. We must take care to understand 
that this is revisionist history, but the revisions are helping us move away from the 
mythologising hero- worship. Here, I must invoke Isaac Newton and note that newer 
insights into the war in German East Africa using the lens of environmental history are 
only possible by standing on the shoulders of Anderson, Krause, Paice, Strachan and 
Samson and I have every intention of continuing to build on their work to help move 
past the hero narrative of Lettow as the ‘Lion of Africa’ or Richard Meinertzhagen as 
a larger-than-life British hero. After all, the unique conditions in German East Africa 
during the war years (1914– 1918) put the British army against the environment as 
much as (perhaps more so) than against Lettow and the German army.142 
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